Disagreement and philosophical method

Knowledge, Theory of;Verbal self-defense--Philosophy;Methodology

Cook, James ; Brown, Jessica (Jessica Anne) ; Brown, Jessica (Jessica Anne)

University:University of St Andrews

Department:Philosophical, Anthropological & Film Studies (School of)

关键词: Knowledge, Theory of;    Verbal self-defense--Philosophy;    Methodology;   

Others  :  https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10023/9458/JamesCookMPhilThesis.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y

来源: DR-NTU

【 摘 要 】

This dissertation is primarily concerned with the subjects of disagreement,argument, and the methodology of philosophy. The first chapter sets out andattempts to answer the question of what the connection between disagreementand disputing is. The second chapter is primarily a investigation into the natureof verbal disputes. The answer the chapter puts forward is that there is ajustificatory relation (or at least we behave as if there is one) between disagreeingand disputing, so that, for example, if two parties do not disagree in the rightway, then they (prima facie) should not dispute. In the second chapter I will look ata few theories of verbal disputes, and I will discuss some of the features such atheory should have. I go on to explicitly endorse a version of David Chalmers'stheory of verbal disputes, and defend it from some potential objections. The thirdchapter is a defence of the method of conceptual analysis in philosophy. Iintroduce some potential objections to the Canberra plan style of conceptualanalysis, and show how a different conception of conceptual analyses could getover these problems. The conception of conceptual analysis I argue for is heavilyinspired by Rudolf Carnap's system of explication. The main way Carnapianexplication would differ from the Canberra plan style of conceptual analysis is inthe way that it would allow one to move further away from the original conceptin analysing it, by balancing closeness to the original concept against otherspecific criteria.