Multi-client lobbyists are individuals authorized to represent two or more distinct interests during legislative sessions. Over the past three decades, interest groups in the United States have increasingly come to rely on these lobbyists for representation. In 1989, nearly 57 percent of the 26,998 interest groups in the U.S. states employed at least one multi-client lobbyist. By 2011, nearly 81 percent of the 54,320 clients hired at least one. Moreover, the average number of multi-client lobbyists hired per client increased from 1.26 to 2.56. There was a corresponding decrease in the hiring of single-client lobbyists as well.I examine how lobby laws and legislative institutions affect multi-client lobbying in the American states. To date, no study has sought to measure multi-client lobbying directly, and no one has tested explanations for why interest groups hire different kinds of advocates in different states. I address both these gaps in our understanding of interest mobilization. I rely on an original data set compiled from all U.S. states and multiple decades to measure and explain how often groups hire multi-client lobbyists. My findings have implications for how lobby laws and legislative assemblies might be reformed to improve the representation of diverse interest groups. Related reforms have changed how interests get represented in the state capitols.I approach multi-client lobbying from three different perspectives. I first argue that multi-client lobbying within U.S. states can be measured by comparing totals of unique lobbyist-client dyads to totals of unique lobbyists and clients. I then find that multi-client lobbying is more prevalent in states with more registration criteria, but that reporting requirements dampen this positive correlation. Multi-client advocacy became more prevalent in legislatures that became more competitive along partisan lines and where members were provided more staff support over time. In addition, the imposition of term limits reduced overall numbers of lobbyists hired, but did not affect rates of multi-client lobbying.In order to determine which kinds of groups are most likely to hire multi-client agents, I measure multi-client lobbying at the level of individual interest groups. I argue that public interest groups are less likely to hire multi-client lobbyists than private interests due to economic and membership-related reasons. Public interests advocate for the state provision of public goods. Unlike private interests such as business corporations, public interests seek to maintain a constant lobby presence. It is more efficient for them to hire in-house, single-client lobbyists on a salaried basis. Moreover, dues-paying members derive more purposive benefit from giving to such in-house lobby enterprises. I find that public interests prefer single-client advocates, even after controlling for total lobbyists hired, and an array of lobby laws and institutional variables.I then examine sources of multi-client lobbying by exploring the backgrounds of lobbyists. States legislatures produce different numbers of former lawmakers who became revolving-door lobbyists. While legislative turnover produces more former lawmakers, it also reduces their value as lobbyists. As incumbent legislators are replaced by new ones, the existing relationships and knowledge that former lawmakers have lose value. As a result, proportionately fewer former lawmakers become lobbyists in states with high turnover. Cooling-off laws dampen totals of revolving-door lobbyists as well. Nevertheless, former legislators tend to represent multiple interest groups, thereby partly explaining rates of multi-client advocacy.
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