Delegated Dictatorship: Examining the State and Market Forces behind Information Control in China

censorship;information control;China;social media;internet;delegation;Political Science;Social Sciences;Political Science

Miller, BlakeValentino, Nicholas A ;

University of Michigan

关键词: censorship;    information control;    China;    social media;    internet;    delegation;    Political Science;    Social Sciences;    Political Science;   

Others  :  https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/147514/blakeapm_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

瑞士|英语

来源: The Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship

【 摘 要 】

A large body of literature devoted to analyzing information control in China concludes that we find imperfect censorship because the state has adopted a minimalist strategy for information control. In other words, the state is deliberately selective about the content that it censors. While some claim that the government limits its attention to the most categorically harmful content—content that may lead to mobilization—others suggest that the state limits the scope of censorship to allow space for criticism which enables the state to gather information about popular grievances or badly performing local cadres.In contrast, I argue that imperfect censorship in China results from a precise and covert implementation of the government;;s maximalist strategy for information control. The state is intolerant of government criticisms, discussions of collective action, non-official coverage of crime, and a host of other types of information that may challenge state authority and legitimacy. This strategy produces imperfect censorship because the state prefers to implement it covertly, and thus, delegates to private companies, targets repression, and engages in astroturfing to reduce the visibility and disruptiveness of information control tactics. This both insulates the state from popular backlash and increases the effectiveness of its informational interventions.I test the hypotheses generated from this theory by analyzing a custom dataset of censorship logs from a popular social media company, Sina Weibo. These logs measure the government;;s intent about what content should and should not be censored. A systematic analysis of content targeted for censorship demonstrates the broadness of the government;;s censorship agenda. These data also show that delegation to private companies softens and refines the state;;s informational interventions so that the government;;s broad agenda is maximally implemented while minimizing popular backlash that would otherwise threaten the effectiveness of its informational interventions.