This work considers the effects of market structure and regulation on firm conduct and welfare in retail markets. The first chapter considers market structure as a potential explanation for uniform (non-discriminatory) pricing across stores in a retail chain. I use structural empirical methods to show that the presence of an imperfectly competitive upstream wholesale market that is vertically separated from the retailer can reduce the retail chain;;s incentive to price discriminate across stores. I also discuss the welfare and policy implications of the retailer;;s uniform pricing. The second chapter considers the effects of a minimum markup policy imposed on retailers in an oligopolistic, differentiated products market where consumers have a ;;taste for variety.” In particular, I consider the effect of the minimum markup on the number of products offered by firms. I present a model in which the introduction of a minimum markup induces firms to expand their number of products offered and show that this product line expansion has important implications for the economic variables of interest to policymakers.