Primary Resources, Secondary Labor: Natural Resources and Immigration Policy around the World.

immigration policy;political economy;Political Science;Social Sciences;Political Science

Shin, Adrian J.Osgood, Iain Guthrie ;

University of Michigan

关键词: immigration policy;    political economy;    Political Science;    Social Sciences;    Political Science;   

Others  :  https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/133201/adrianjs_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

瑞士|英语

来源: The Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship

【 摘 要 】

This dissertation seeks to understand why some policymakers open their borders to unskilled immigrants while others restrict immigration, by looking at the effects of natural resource wealth on pro-immigration firms and policymakers. The three empirical chapters in the dissertation examine the mechanisms through which revenues from capital-intensive natural resources shape immigration policy toward low-skilled workers from the developing world. I find that natural resource wealth has differential effects on immigration policy under different political institutions. Chapter 3 explores the link between natural resource wealth and immigration policy formation in wealthy democracies. In this chapter, I find that substantial natural resource wealth leads to policy restrictions on immigration inflows by reducing the size of the pro-immigration business coalition. Moreover, trade liberalization exacerbates this negative effect of natural resource income on immigration policy openness by expediting firm deaths in the tradable sector. These adverse effects do not materialize in economies lacking resource income, so firms there seek to remain viable under trade liberalization by supporting pro-immigration policy. In Chapter 4, I test the hypotheses and find similar results by using the data on U.S. senators’ voting behavior on immigration bills from 1964 to 2008. Finally, Chapter 6 examines the effects of natural resource rents on the immigration policies of 13 relatively wealthy autocracies after World War II. In contrast to Chapters 3 and 4, I find that the natural resource wealth is positively associated with more open immigration policy in autocracies. As the distribution of resource rents in rentier autocracies reduces the incentive of domestic labor to enter the labor force, rentier states rely on migrant workers to meet the demand for low-skilled labor. Autocrats without resource rents, however, lack capacity for redistribution, so they use policies that provide people with wages in exchange for their labor while restricting immigration. The remaining chapters provide supplementary information such as details on immigration policy index construction and additional evidence from field research. I conclude the dissertation with future research suggestions and broader implications for political science research.