Problems to Appreciate: Aesthetics, Ethics, and the Imagination.

Aesthetics;Ethics;Imagination;Appreciation;Value;Art;Philosophy;Humanities;Philosophy

Stear, Nils-HennesBuss, Sarah ;

University of Michigan

关键词: Aesthetics;    Ethics;    Imagination;    Appreciation;    Value;    Art;    Philosophy;    Humanities;    Philosophy;   

Others  :  https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/120763/nstear_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

瑞士|英语

来源: The Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship

【 摘 要 】

What is aesthetic appreciation? What values is it concerned with? This dissertation consists of three distinct papers tackling problems related to these questions.Chapter OneAccording to what I call the Merit Principle, roughly, works of art that attempt to elicit unmerited responses fail on their own terms and are thereby aesthetically flawed. In the first chapter, I show how the principle leads to paradox when applied to an undertheorized class of artworks I call ;;seductive artworks”, which invite an unmerited first-order response in order to invite a repudiation of that response. I consider a number of unsuccessful solutions to the paradox, before rejecting the Merit Principle as it stands. I conclude by briefly discussing what is challenging about seductive artworks and by proposing a revision to the Merit Principle. Chapter TwoGenerally, we cooperate imaginatively with literary fictions, however bizarre, and the things authors write into their stories become true in the fiction. But for some claims, such as moral falsehoods, this seems not to be straightforwardly the case, which raises the question: Why not? The puzzles such cases raise are sometimes grouped under the heading ;;imaginative resistance”. In this paper, I argue against what I take to be the best attempts to (a) dismiss the puzzles and (b) solve them. I also tease out subtleties not sufficiently addressed in the existing literature and end by defending a unified solution of my own. The solution’s novelty lies in its giving a normative rather than psychological or alethic explanation for the puzzling phenomena.Chapter ThreeThe third chapter looks at the tenability of understanding our engagement with sport along the lines of our engagement with works of fiction. Specifically, it addresses an incongruity in our attitudes towards the outcomes of competitive games and asks why these outcomes frequently prompt intense reactions, while often also seeming utterly trivial. I show why the temptation to understand our engagement with sport as akin to our engagement with works of fiction—as involving games of make-believe—faces serious theoretical obstacles. I end by exploring two alternative possibilities to the proposal.