Three Essays on the Economics of the Oil and Gas Industry.

Energy Economics;Economics;Business and Economics;Economics

Lewis, Eric KyleSalant, Stephen W. ;

University of Michigan

关键词: Energy Economics;    Economics;    Business and Economics;    Economics;   

Others  :  https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/113565/erickyle_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

瑞士|英语

来源: The Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship

【 摘 要 】

In this dissertation I explore the economics of the oil and gas industry, with a particular focus on onshore leasing, drilling, and production. Using theory, data, and a variety of natural experiments, I analyze the impact of ownership, policies, and markets on drilling and production outcomes.In the first chapter I discuss the impact of heterogeneous mineral ownership on the oil and gas industry. I show how policies imposed by one owner can affect extraction both on that owner’s land as well as on nearby land. Using a natural experiment in Wyoming, I find that low cost policies on state land increased drilling on state land while decreasing drilling on nearby federal land. I also find that state policies helped firms discover lower productivity wells both on state land and on nearby federal land.In the second chapter, co-authored with Paul Brehm, I explore how efficiently markets correct for misallocation. We examine a setting where oil and gas leases were awarded to individuals who likely lacked the expertise and capital to efficiently extract oil and gas. In spite of this initial misallocation, we find that these leases were usually quickly sold to firms. As a result, these leases had similar drilling and production outcomes to leases that were awarded to firms. In the third chapter I examine a setting in Wyoming where alternating blocks of land were assigned either to government ownership or to private ownership. I describe how government and private land differed in environmental protection, lease lengths, lease sizes, and quality of management. I find that in spite of environmental protections on government land, government land was more likely to have experienced drilling. I show why longer leases, smaller parcels, or inefficient management of private land may have decreased drilling on private land. I also find that after an oil and gas firm took over management of the private land, drilling and production outcomes improved on private land relative to government land.