A Dynamic Theory of Party Discipline, Legislator Roll-Call Voting & Electoral Accountability in the U.S. House.

Congress;Legislative Behavior;Elections;Democratic Accountability;Political Parties;Agent-Based Modeling;Political Science;Social Sciences;Political Science

Doriean, Charles J.Hall, Richard L. ;

University of Michigan

关键词: Congress;    Legislative Behavior;    Elections;    Democratic Accountability;    Political Parties;    Agent-Based Modeling;    Political Science;    Social Sciences;    Political Science;   

Others  :  https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/111369/cdoriean_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

瑞士|英语

来源: The Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship

【 摘 要 】

The purpose of this dissertation is to explain observed rates of party unity on roll-call voting in the U.S. House, by determining the conditions under which Representatives cross-pressured between party and constituency choose to side with the latter. To help answer this question, I develop a dynamic model of party discipline, legislator vote choice and electoral feedback, and analyze it to develop insights about how partisan context and electoral threat condition the behavior of marginal legislators. I then test the model;;s predictions, both at the level of the party caucus and at the level of individual legislators. I find strong support for the idea that partisan context conditions the possible dispersion of party unity rates across a legislative caucus, but only mixed support for predictions regarding factors that may affect the responsiveness of individual legislator vote behavior to their own electoral security.