My dissertation defends a Humean theory of property rights against its neo-Lockean and ;;resource egalitarian’ rivals. Humean property rights are conventional and not grounded in pre-institutional moral entitlements. Nevertheless, the importance of property rights for facilitating social cooperation between people with differing views about justice gives them normative authority even when they do not conform to ideal principles of distributive justice or ;;natural right.’ I develop a conceptual architecture of property rights and property interests in order to dispel confusion about the relationship between property’s legal form and economic substance. Although the structure of property rights constrains the extent to which property ownership can be fragmented in the service of egalitarian distributive goals, robust private property rights are compatible with extensive social insurance.This analysis undermines the neo-Lockean position that all redistributive taxation is an infringement of property rights and provides an attractive middle ground between libertarianism and strong forms of egalitarianism.Humean theory justifies giving normative weight to pre-tax property entitlements when determining tax obligations.I use this insight to rebut Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel’s argument that principles of tax equity are vacuous because pre-tax income has no moral significance.Viewing tax policy exclusively from the perspective of post-tax income effaces the important role of tax fairness norms in preventing wasteful tax policy when people disagree about fundamental principles of distributive justice. I distinguish my view from Gerald Gaus’ recent critique of Murphy and Nagel.Whereas Gaus is skeptical of redistributive taxation, my theory of tax fairness is compatible both with classical liberalism and with a more robust social welfare state.
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