Protecting Civilians Abroad:Why States Participate in the Liberal Post-Cold War Collective Security System.

International Humanitarian Efforts;Peacekeeping;Peacebuilding;Political Science;Social Sciences;Political Science

Uzonyi, Gary JuliusStam, Allan C. ;

University of Michigan

关键词: International Humanitarian Efforts;    Peacekeeping;    Peacebuilding;    Political Science;    Social Sciences;    Political Science;   

Others  :  https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/99978/guzonyi_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

瑞士|英语

来源: The Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship

【 摘 要 】

Why do leaders intervene in the domestic conflicts of other countries to protect civilians in the area? Humanitarian interventions and the financing of peacebuilding projects have become integral in maintaining the post-Cold War collective security system. Extant theories explain these patterns either through a focus on nebulous concepts of state interest or the diffusion of norms and the desire for democracies to promote their behavior abroad. Empirically, however, states display an inconsistent commitment to humanitarian behavior. I argue that much of the emphasis that post-Cold War humanitarianism places on the protection of civilians is designed to control refugee flows in the conflict region. This helps explain why many illiberal leaders, who do not offer protection to their own civilians, are willing to promote human rights outside their own borders. To clarify where and when leaders involve their countries in international humanitarian efforts, I develop a theory that explains leaders’ decisions to extend protection to civilians outside their borders. I argue that a leader becomes more likely to send troops and money abroad to protect foreign civilians when abuses by the foreign government threaten to turn those civilians into refugees that may find their way into the leader’s territory. I explain the effect refugees have on host countries, how this induces the leaders of would-be-receiving-states to take action, and why these leaders will be willing to participate in projects aimed at protecting potential refugees. I treat humanitarian assistance as an evolving process, and explain how changes on the ground during a crisis affect leaders’ strategies of support during interventions. This theoretical contribution helps explain many patterns of seemingly inconsistent support by donor countries during humanitarian projects. The breadth of my theory allows me to predict which leaders become involved, how they contribute, where they participate, when they offer their support and when they withdraw.