Police, Paramilitaries, Nationalists and Gangsters: The Processes of State Building in Korea.

Democratization of Coercion;State Development and Expansion;Korea;Japan;US;State-Non-State Collaboration;Political Science;Social Sciences;Political Science

Porteux, Jonson NathanielMc Elwain, Kenneth Mori ;

University of Michigan

关键词: Democratization of Coercion;    State Development and Expansion;    Korea;    Japan;    US;    State-Non-State Collaboration;    Political Science;    Social Sciences;    Political Science;   

Others  :  https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/102333/jporteux_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

瑞士|英语

来源: The Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship

【 摘 要 】

This dissertation seeks to understand why developed democracies with high state capacity tolerate, and in some cases cooperate with criminal organizations such as paramilitaries, mafia organizations, and vigilantes.The symbiotic relationship between these groups is surprisingly common, but it blurs the lines between legitimate and illegitimate use of violence and allows political actors to circumvent democratic checks on state authority.While previous research has linked illicit violence to weak or failing states, my study is unique in its empirical and theoretical focus on both economically and politically developed governments.It is argued that state monopoly over the use of violence purposefully varies.Political actors must continually exercise their authority in the face of both resource and politically driven constraints in the complex processes of state building, and state maintaining. In the face of resource constraints, political actors sub-contract violence in order to extend their reach and expand their forces. Sub-contracting as a result of principally politically driven constraints however, serves two goals beyond an expansion of forces. First, it allows political actors to distance themselves from police actions deemed illiberal—and hence unpopular—by society. Second, because criminal groups are extra-legal organizations, subcontracting allows the state to avoid transparency and accountability constraints.The choice to subcontract is thus conditioned not only by the end goal, but also by social pressures regarding appropriate means to bring about preferred outcomes.Importantly, the political payoffs from subcontracting are high in states with high levels of operational capacity, as they can best manage the potential risk that criminal groups metastasize and challenge state authority directly.Unbiased, quantifiable data on the linkage between state actors and illicit organizations are—largely by design—impossible to obtain.My primary analysis is based on a year of fieldwork in South Korea, utilizing evidence gleaned from interviews with the police, prosecutors, journalists, mafia members, and victims.