Explaining the Use and Policy Impact of Congressional Conference Committees.

Conference Committees in the U.S. Congress;Political Science;Social Sciences;Political Science

Magleby, Daniel BlythMebane Jr, Walter R. ;

University of Michigan

关键词: Conference Committees in the U.S. Congress;    Political Science;    Social Sciences;    Political Science;   

Others  :  https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/89844/dmagleby_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

瑞士|英语

来源: The Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship

【 摘 要 】

This dissertation addresses three puzzles associated with the conference process in the United States Congress.First, it seeks to explain why conference committees routinely produce bills that do not represent a compromise version of the bills initially passed by the House and Senate. I develop a method for measuring bills;; relative locations, and show that the patterns in conference outcomes are inconsistent with compromise -- an outcome intermediate to the versions of the bill first passed by the House and Senate.Next, I explore a majoritarian explanation that suggests that conference outcomes will be dictated by the preferences of the median member of the House and Senate, and I propose an alternative explanation that suggests that conference outcomes should be the product of the conference committee;;s preferences.The data provide weak support for the former explanation and very strong support for the latter. Second, I consider the puzzling empirical regularity of deference by majoritarian institutions like the House and Senate to powerful, outlying conference committees.I present a formal theory of conferee selection where legislators have politically oriented goals in addition to policy oriented goals.I also assume that legislators reach their political goals by way of interaction with interests that compete for legislators;; support.These interests extend or withhold political resources in order to persuade legislators to support their position.I find that when this is the case, a majority of legislatorsprefer policy proposed by preference outliers.Finally, this dissertation answers the question of why legislators use conference committees to resolve differences in some instances, but not in others.I expand upon my model and assume that calling for a conference committee is tantamount to adding additional rounds of bargaining and voting to the legislative game. Thus, conference committees provide legislators with additional opportunities for extracting political benefits from interests who wish to influence the legislative process. It follows that conference committees will be more likely in situations and for bills that deal with issues that provide ample political benefits.Data collected from the 93rd to the 110th Congresses support my claims.