Aristotle’s view of rational thought is understudied and little understood. Scholarly energy focuses on his deductive theory of science, knowledge and grasp of first principles, all of which involve certainty and necessary truth. Aristotle also, however, pays systematic attention to bounded rationality and reasoning about contingent matters.Belief, for Aristotle, is about the contingent. It ranks below scientific knowledge, but still above any cognition animals are capable of: only rational animals believe. Aristotle’s theory of belief, then, provides data for his broader theory of reasoning and human rationality. I therefore organize the dissertation around three arguments which distinguish belief from other forms of mental representation that we share with animals.(1) Belief requires credence, which depends upon the ability to represent matters as more or less likely, and therefore the ability to see facts as evidence for other facts. These two abilities require reason and are partially constitutive of rational thought. Animals can be conditioned to act in certain ways given certain inputs, but this ability differs from the weighing of evidence.(2) We cannot form beliefs as we please, while we can do so with other forms of mental representation, such as imagining. Belief is out of our hands in this way because it has a normative connection to truth. It is supposed to be true, and must therefore submit to normative evaluation with respect to truth. This accountability to norms is partially constitutive of rational thought.(3) Belief causes affective response in ways that other mental states, such as imagining, do not. Imagining can cause emotional response, but does not necessitate it in the way belief does. The ability to entertain mental content without committing to it is peculiar to rational creatures, and therefore partially constitutive of rational thought. Rationality confers the ability to question, test and be open to doubt.
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