The Dynamics of Protracted Terror Campaigns: Domestic Politics, TerroristViolence, and Counterterror Responses.

Terrorism;Counterterrorism;Counterinsurgency;Conflict Management and Resolution;Political Science;Social Sciences;Public Policy & Political Science

Kavanagh, Jennifer ErinStam, Allan C. ;

University of Michigan

关键词: Terrorism;    Counterterrorism;    Counterinsurgency;    Conflict Management and Resolution;    Political Science;    Social Sciences;    Public Policy & Political Science;   

Others  :  https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/84524/jennkav_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

瑞士|英语

来源: The Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship

【 摘 要 】

Existing literature does not explain why protracted terror-counterterror conflicts are sometimes characterized by escalating, tit-for-tat retaliation, but exhibit little responsive violence at other points. I argue that the expectations of local constituents and local political dynamics are primary determinants of conflict escalation and de-escalation. State and non-state constituents form expectations about the efficacy of violent and political approaches to a protracted conflict through Retrospective Projection, which combines evaluations of the past, present, and future. Demands for violence are most likely when the expected benefits of a military (militant)-based strategy exceed confidence in existing political alternatives. Demands for retaliation by local publics create incentives for state and non-state actors to use violence as a tool of Constituent Service. I evaluate the argument with extended case studies of Northern Ireland’s ;;Troubles’ and the Second Intifada, supplemented by four qualitative cases: Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Iraq, and Pakistan. The extended case studies combine qualitative discussion and quantitative analysis using vector autoregression (VAR) to empirically describe dynamic associations between violence and political attitudes. Consistent with the argument, constituent expectations about the efficacy of violent and political alternatives influence the timing of demands for retaliation, and demands for violence determine the timing and form of armed retaliation by state and non-state actors. Demands for violence occur where military-based strategies appear more effective than political alternatives, prior to 2002 in the Second Intifada and in the 1970s during the ;;Troubles,’ and retaliatory violence is most likely in these same periods. Military failures and political alternatives that weaken constituent support for violence encourage de-escalation. Effective counterterror policies are those that shift the balance between expected military efficacy and political optimism, constraining violence by reducing demands for violence. There is a place for military-based counterterrorism, but the case studies underscore the benefits of strategies that encourage confidence in political alternatives. Law-enforcement counterterrorism and influence operations appear especially valuable because they erode support for violence and shape attitudes towards political compromise at the local level. Local political dynamics and constituent expectations must inform counterterror policy applied in regional protracted terror conflicts and used against transnational terrorist threats.