This dissertation begins an exploration into the transition fromnon-existence to existence by investigating how we talk aboutprocesses and objects of creation.Two types of expression areimportant to talk about processes of creation: the progressive(i.e., the is VERB-ing construction in sentences such as ;;Mary isbuilding a house;;) and verbs of creation (e.g., ;;make a cake;; and;;build a house;;).I explore the interactions between theseexpressions and with indefinite noun phrases (e.g., ;;a house;; and ;;acake;;) in three stages.Stage one: I argue against the modal view of the progressive. Themodal view claims that ;;Mary is building a house;; is true just incase all the worlds in which Mary continues to build a house withoutinterruption are such that Mary eventually builds a house.Stagetwo: in light of my rejection of the modal view, I aim to develop anaccount of the progressive in which a sentence such as ;;Mary isbuilding a house;; is true only if there is a building event withMary as agent that holds at some time.One major problem for thisaccount is that the truth of ;;Mary is building a house;; does notentail the existence of a house.I account for this by suggestingthat verb phrases such as ;;build a house;; introduce a relationbetween an event and a property that is denoted by the indefiniteexpression ;;a house;;.Additionally, I define a predicate ;;Goal;; tocapture the telic content of verbs of creation.Stage three: I turnto recent work that suggests progressive sentences with verbs ofcreation entail the existence of some thing even if thatthing cannot be described by the relevant indefinite expression.After presenting a series of arguments against this proposal, Ielaborate how the property account can be used to account forfailure of existential commitment in progressive sentences withverbs of creation.Finally, I discuss the significance of this workwith regard to the metaphysics of processes and objects of creation.
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