Does Casework Build Support for a Strong Parliament? Legislative Representation and Public Opinion in Morocco and Algeria.

Parliament;Authoritarian Politics;Morocco and Algeria;Democratization;Islamist Parties;Constituency Service;Middle Eastern;Near Eastern and North African Studies;Political Science;Social Sciences;Public Policy & Political Science

Benstead, Lindsay J.Kollman, Kenneth W. ;

University of Michigan

关键词: Parliament;    Authoritarian Politics;    Morocco and Algeria;    Democratization;    Islamist Parties;    Constituency Service;    Middle Eastern;    Near Eastern and North African Studies;    Political Science;    Social Sciences;    Public Policy & Political Science;   

Others  :  https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/61674/lbenstea_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

瑞士|英语

来源: The Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship

【 摘 要 】

Why do legislatures lengthen the tenure of authoritarian regimes?In order to gain insight into this question, this dissertation examines how parliamentary institutions influence members’ participation in debate and provision of casework and how the representative link shapes constituent attitudes toward the parliament.It argues that public opinion serves as a contextual factor in future rounds of elite-level bargaining over the prerogatives of the legislature and is a neglected part of a causal story which accounts for the empirical regularity identified by Gandhi and Przeworski. The project provides a description and analysis of casework practices in Morocco and Algeria.It makes three empirical contributions.First, it demonstrates that parliamentary institutions vary within a class of authoritarian regimes and shape members’ choice of activities.It suggests that representation is a mechanism of cooptation occurring as members bargain for reelection in elite and mass arenas.Incumbent preferences for level of debate and casework capacity vary by regime type, explaining why Moroccan members participate more frequently in parliamentary debate and have higher caseloads than do Algerian members and why debate and casework are substitutes in Algeria and complements in Morocco.Second, it illustrates that incumbent preferences for debate in Morocco create an institutional opening for opposition elites, in this case Islamist parties, to more fully develop party-focused strategies and programmatic benefits than their counterparts in Algeria.It shows that Moroccan Islamist deputies are more likely to perceive incentives to cultivate a party reputation and to devote time to policymaking, but no more or less likely to have higher caseloads than are members of other parties.Algerian Islamist deputies do not differ from other parties on these outcomes.Third, it demonstrates that incumbent strategies to engineer loyal parliaments have implications for public opinion.Provision of casework—arguably the primary representative function in Morocco and Algeria—is not associated with greater popular support for strong parliamentary prerogatives.Rather, individual-level support is related to perceptions that elections are more transparent and that political parties and deputies are more effective.The results inform literature on authoritarian politics and have implications for legislative strengthening programs.