Private Business to Public Service: Robert McNamara's Management Techniques and Their Limits in Peace and War

Robert McNamara;Management;Vietnam War;Ford Motor Company;History

Beveridge, Albert J.Sheinngate, Adam D. ;

Johns Hopkins University

关键词: Robert McNamara;    Management;    Vietnam War;    Ford Motor Company;    History;   

Others  :  https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/60289/BEVERIDGE-DISSERTATION-2014.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

瑞士|英语

来源: JOHNS HOPKINS DSpace Repository

【 摘 要 】

ABSTRACTThis dissertation evaluates Robert S. McNamara’s management practices during his tenure as Secretary of Defense, concluding that over-centralized decision-making proved to be the central feature of his management style with one significant exception. When it came to war, notably the Vietnam War, he undermanaged important aspects of that conflict. To better understand McNamara’s management decisions, this dissertation sets them in the context of his brilliance as a student in college and later in graduate school where he absorbed the technocratic management techniques then developing at the Harvard Business School. He applied his education successfully in the Army Air Force during World War II and later at the Ford Motor Company.As Secretary of Defense he initiated a rigorous analytic approach to the defense budget and weapons acquisition through the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) he installed and the associated discipline of systems analysis that he brought to the department. Yet those innovations had the perverse effect of encouraging his proclivity to concentrate on managing data rather than managing people. Through costly errors such as the TFX plane controversy, McNamara discovered the limits of technocratic business procedures in a public service environment which required a politically sensitive and socially adept approach.McNamara disregarded many contemporary managerial techniques and models which emphasized delegation, flexibility, and informal communication.His reluctance to delegate left many subordinates and colleagues without significant institutional roles in decision-making and thus without personal investment in the success of directives emanating from the office of the Secretary. More importantly, the plethora of low-level procedural decisions he funneled through his office took his time and attention away from more important high-level policy issues like the war. When viewed in the full context of his responsibilities, his overconcentration on budgets, logistics, and procedural details contributed to his relatively passive acceptance of the military’s battle strategies in Vietnam, which deserved closer examination. Bridging the histories of politics, war and public administration, this dissertation interrogates the context and consequences of McNamara’s application of current business management practice to public institutions.Adviser: Louis GalambosReaders: Ronald G. Walters, Angus Bergin, Steven M. Teles, Adam D. Sheingate