Neo-Aristotelian-Wittgensteinian Ontology: The Logical Form of the Proposition, Philosophical Explanation, and Categorial Thought

Wittgenstein;Wittgensteinian Tradition;Philosophical Categories;Categories;Categorial;Categorial Framework;Confusion of Categories;Categorial Confusion;Meta-Philosophy;Diagnosis;Philosophical Problems;Grammar;Negation;Predicate Negation;Contrariety;Ontological Feature;Dimension;Term Logic;Proposition;Element of a Proposition;Logical Form;Third Realm;Early Analytic Philosophy;G. E. Moore;Bertrand Russell;Fred Sommers;J. L. Austin;Gilbert Ryle;P. F. Strawson;Ontology;Categorematic;Syncategorematic;Substance;Non-Substance;Highest Genus;Something;Nothing;Sense;Nonsense;General Facts of Nature;The Given;Philosophical Explanation;Analysis;Internal Property;Recollection;Socrates;Kierkegaard;Ordinary Language Philosophy;Use of a Word;Linguistic Priority;Linguistic Turn;Neo-Aristotelian;Cartesian;Crypto-Cartesian;Mereological Fallacy;P. M. S. Hacker;Max Bennett;John McDowell;John Searle;James Conant;Aristotelian Souls;Natural World;Human World;Human Being;Animals;Plants;Biological Function;Artifacts;Artifactual;Machine;Computer;Chain of Being;Scala Naturae;Natural History;The Good;Formal Cause;Material Cause;Final Cause;Heidegger;Aristotle;Philosophy

James, Alexander CharlesMarrati, Paola ;

Johns Hopkins University

关键词: Wittgenstein;    Wittgensteinian Tradition;    Philosophical Categories;    Categories;    Categorial;    Categorial Framework;    Confusion of Categories;    Categorial Confusion;    Meta-Philosophy;    Diagnosis;    Philosophical Problems;    Grammar;    Negation;    Predicate Negation;    Contrariety;    Ontological Feature;    Dimension;    Term Logic;    Proposition;    Element of a Proposition;    Logical Form;    Third Realm;    Early Analytic Philosophy;    G. E. Moore;    Bertrand Russell;    Fred Sommers;    J. L. Austin;    Gilbert Ryle;    P. F. Strawson;    Ontology;    Categorematic;    Syncategorematic;    Substance;    Non-Substance;    Highest Genus;    Something;    Nothing;    Sense;    Nonsense;    General Facts of Nature;    The Given;    Philosophical Explanation;    Analysis;    Internal Property;    Recollection;    Socrates;    Kierkegaard;    Ordinary Language Philosophy;    Use of a Word;    Linguistic Priority;    Linguistic Turn;    Neo-Aristotelian;    Cartesian;    Crypto-Cartesian;    Mereological Fallacy;    P. M. S. Hacker;    Max Bennett;    John McDowell;    John Searle;    James Conant;    Aristotelian Souls;    Natural World;    Human World;    Human Being;    Animals;    Plants;    Biological Function;    Artifacts;    Artifactual;    Machine;    Computer;    Chain of Being;    Scala Naturae;    Natural History;    The Good;    Formal Cause;    Material Cause;    Final Cause;    Heidegger;    Aristotle;    Philosophy;   

Others  :  https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/60540/JAMES-DISSERTATION-2015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

瑞士|英语

来源: JOHNS HOPKINS DSpace Repository

【 摘 要 】

If we regard the investigation into ;;grammar” and ;;ordinary language” in the Wittgensteinian tradition as concerned, not with sentences, but with propositions (as this notion is roughly understood in the historically foundational work of the analytic tradition), and if we eschew the suggestion that Wittgenstein has a ;;theory of meaning”, and regard him, instead, as understanding meaning in a non-reductive way, the result would be a meta-philosophical framework that allows us to see this tradition as continuous (at a meta-philosophical level) with certain Socratic and Aristotelian paradigms of inquiry in ancient philosophy. Once this link is established, the Wittgensteinian tradition can then be seen, implicitly, to contain the foundations for a neo-Aristotelian-Wittgensteinian-analytic ontology. I, explicitly, define and develop this ontology.Some of the conclusions, which emerge from this neo-Aristotelian-Wittgensteinian ontological framework, are as follows: (i) There is a fundamental distinction between the human world and the natural world. (ii) The human being, and his irreducible powers of reason and action, belong to the human world, whereas the physiology of the human being belongs to the natural world. (iii) The natural world (which includes the sui generis animal, merely biological and merely physical domains, respectively) is not unified by any positive characteristic, but is bound together only by its privative-contrast with the human world: thus, the natural world cannot be defined as the ;;realm of law”. (iv) Both Cartesian dualism and post-Cartesian materialistic-naturalism, despite their ontical disagreements, ascribe to one and the same understanding of the of organization and character of the basic categorial domains of reality. (v) So-called ;;philosophical problems” concerning something’s ;;place in” the ;;natural world”, e.g., the problem of ;;free-will” or problem of ;;consciousness” or the problem of ;;life”, are by-passed and overcome, but not by showing that these problems arise from confusions concerning ;;uses of words”, but by showing that these problems, together with their characteristic ;;solutions”, are themselves a function of this false ontology. Once this ontology is replaced with a ;;neo-Aristotelian-Wittgensteinian” one, such problems do not arise.