Contemporary epistemologists are overwhelmingly focused on justification and related notions of epistemic normativity, such as responsibility. Yet, before we can evaluate whether a belief is justified or responsibly acquired, there is a deeper concern over whether such evaluations are apt, whether one is the appropriate target of responsibility ascriptions in general. I call this the question of epistemic competence. I examine two possible explanations for when one is the appropriate target of responsibility ascriptions—doxastic control and awareness. When an individual can control their beliefs and/or is aware of what they believe, they are epistemically competent. I argue that neither explanation is sufficient and perhaps not even necessary when it comes to competence. While we do exercise influence over what we believe using our cognitive abilities, we do not control our beliefs. Moreover, since we can rightly be held responsible for our beliefs even in cases where we formed a belief we were unaware we should not have, epistemic awareness likewise fails to adequately explain epistemic competence. Instead, I argue that what opens one up to epistemic responsibility is a constellation of cognitive abilities the exercise or manifestation of which is a kind of know-how. In particular, because the cognitive abilities in question—the abilities to recognize and assess justifying reasons for belief—increase one’s reliability at achieving knowledge, to possess those abilities is to know how to know.
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Knowing How to Know: Competence and Epistemic Evaluability
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