To Repeat or not to Repeat? Assessing COIN's Past to Determine Iraq's Future

IraqCOINCounterinsurgency;not listed

Haverty, Elizabeth AnnWolfson, Dorothea ;

Johns Hopkins University

关键词: IraqCOINCounterinsurgency;    not listed;   

Others  :  https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/60159/Haverty_Thesis_PDFA.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y

瑞士|英语

来源: JOHNS HOPKINS DSpace Repository

【 摘 要 】

This paper evaluates the past, present, and future progress of the US counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in Iraq. This paper strives to answer the question: did the US COIN strategy in Iraq improve the GoI’s legitimacy and reduce the chances of a future Sunni extremist resurgence in Iraq? This paper employs a positivist, mixed methods approach to evaluate the effectiveness of one indicator outlined in the US Army’s Field Manual 3-24, improving security conditions for the host nation population. This paper proposed aggregating quantitative data from two unbiased sources to track civilian casualty rates as the conflict progressed. These findings were substantiated by qualitative surveys and interviews of local nationals and COIN implementers. While quantitative data from 2006-2011 upholds the commonly held belief that the COIN strategy improved security conditions in the short-term, the withdrawal of US troops in 2011 and the rapid deterioration of the security environment indicates these changes were unsustainable without US support.This paper then questioned whether parallel conditions in Iraq today would lead to the emergence of a post-Da’ish violent extremist group. This paper first outlined its methods for determining whether the emergence of another extremist group is probable. The use of structural analytic techniques in chapter two indicates the emergence of another group is likely if sectarian tensions and clashes escalate, and chapter three tested this hypothesis by comparing pre and post-Da’ish security conditions in Mosul. In chapter three, quantitative data once again indicates a positive change in the security environment after the GoI began implementing a population centric approach for defeating Da’ish. However, qualitative data from post-Da’ish Mosul indicates that security conditions remained the same or worse for the minority Sunni population. This finding juxtaposes security conditions after 2011 with security conditions in 2018 and indicates the failure of the GoI to implement a reconciliation strategy may once again lead to an extremist uprising. Further, this finding underscores the complexity of assessing the COIN campaigns outcome and highlights the need for more studies on each of the six indicators identified in FM 3-24. Overall, the US must pressure the Government of Iraq to prioritize addressing Sunni grievances to avoid the resurgence of violent extremist organizations or the outbreak of another sectarian civil war.Reviewers: Mike Vlahos and James Van de Velde. Supervised by Dr. Dorothea Wolfson