In John Searle’s Minds, Brains, and Programs, he argues against the possibility of a digital computer capable of understanding.In particular, Searle puts forward the Chinese room thought experiment, which appears to neatly dismiss the concept of a machine made to manipulate symbols thereby obtaining a mind.This thesis replies to Minds, Brains, and Programs by critically examining the Chinese room experiment and the conclusions Searle draws from it. This paper defends what Searle fterms the ;;systems reply” to the Chinese room, which proposes that in the Chinese room thought experiment, the total system of operator, instructions, and input-output may achieve understanding even if the operator alone does not. The defence of the systems reply requires rebutting Searle’s direct objections to it as well as a more general account of the possibility of obtaining semantic content from what appear to be a purely syntactic manipulations.
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