Tax Competition Between Sub-Central Governments

Hansjörg Blöchligeri ; José Maria Pinero Camposi iOECD

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

关键词: tax competition;    sub-national tax policy;    sub-central government;    tax autonomy;    fiscal federalism;   

DOI  :  https://doi.org/10.1787/5kgb1mfm6jnw-en

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: OECD iLibrary

【 摘 要 】

Sub-central tax competition is the strategic interaction of tax policy between jurisdictions with the objective to attract and retain mobile tax bases. The views on tax competition differ widely: while some consider that tax competition brings sub-central fiscal policy closer to citizen?s preferences, increases the efficiency of the public sector and avoids tax and spending excesses, others argue that tax competition leads to a distorted tax structure, to growing tax rate disparities and to an under-provision of public services. The main conclusions of the paper are: tax competition is stronger on mobile taxes (corporate and personal income tax) than on immobile taxes (property tax, consumption taxes); tax rates tend to be lower in wealthier jurisdictions; there is little evidence of a “race to the bottom” with respect to tax rates and tax revenues; and inter-jurisdictional differences in tax raising capacity – or economic wealth – appear to be lower in countries with more tax competition. Governments considering tax competition “excessive” may introduce or amend fiscal equalisation; increase sub-central property taxation and reduce other sub-central taxes; or harmonise the tax bases of sub-central governments to some extent.