Fiscal Gimmickry in Europe : One-Off Measures and Creative Accounting

Vincent Koen ; Paul van den Noord

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

关键词: national accounts;    political economy;    public debt;    fiscal gimmicks;    stability and growth pact;    fiscal deficit;    fiscal rules;    budgets;    Economic and Monetary Union;   

DOI  :  https://doi.org/10.1787/237714513517

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: OECD iLibrary

【 摘 要 】

Accounting conventions usually leave some room for judgment, which governments may be tempted to take advantage of, especially when fiscal rules bite or threaten to do so. The European experience over the past decade -- documented here in great detail -- illustrates that fiscal gimmicks come in many different guises, but also that some are less mischievous than others. Logit regression analysis confirms that when deficit rules or, to a lesser extent, debt thresholds tend to become more binding, recourse to gimmicks is more likely. It also suggests that more centralised budget systems are less prone to such gimmickry. The policy implications are clear as regards the virtues of transparent and consistent accounting practices, but more ambiguous regarding the merits or otherwise of one-off measures ...