Ownership Structure and the Temptation to Loot : Evidence from Privatized Firms in the Czech Republic

Cull, Robert ; Matesova, Jana ; Shirley, Mary

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: ASSETS;    AUCTION;    AUCTIONS;    BANK LOANS;    BANKRUPTCY;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-2568
RP-ID  :  WPS2568

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Using a new data set on privatized firmsin the Czech Republic, the authors examine how the design ofprivatization affects outcomes. Earlier studies ofprivatization in the Czech Republic focused largely on howthe broad distribution of shares through vouchers may havemotivated the new owners to strip assets from the privatizedfirms. The authors find evidence for static asset stripping,but also for what Akerlof and Romer (1993) call looting -borrowing heavily with no intent to repay and using theloans for private purposes. This looting occurred becausethe larger privatized companies had privileged access tocredit from state-controlled banks, which had littleincentive to enforce debt contracts. The policy implicationsare significant: financial incentives and regulation are asimportant as ownership structure in the design of privatization.