Rent-Sharing, Hold-Up, and Manufacturing Wages in Cote d'Ivoire

Azam, Jean-Paul ; Ris, Catherine

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: DEMAND CURVE;    DEVALUATION;    DISCRIMINATION;    DUMMY VARIABLES;    ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-2600
RP-ID  :  WPS2600

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Labor costs in Francophone Africa areconsidered high by the standards of low-income countries, atleast in the formal sector. Are they a brake onindustrialization, or the result of successful enterprisedevelopment? Are they imposed on firms by powerful unions,or government regulations, or a by-product of good firmperformance? The authors empirically analyze what determinesmanufacturing wages in Cote d'Ivoire, using anunbalanced panel of individual wages that allows them tocontrol for observable firm-specific effects. They test therent-sharing, and hold-up theories of wage determination, aswell as some aspects of efficiency-wage theories. Theirresults lean in favor of both rent-sharing, and hold-up,suggesting that workers have some bargaining power, and thatin Cote d'Ivoire workers can force renegotiation oflabor contracts, in response to new investments.