Concession Contract Renegotiations : Some Efficiency versus Equity Dilemmas

Estache, Antonio ; Quesada, Lucia

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: AUCTIONS;    BID;    BIDDERS;    BIDDING;    COLLUSION;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-2705
RP-ID  :  WPS2705

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

The authors analyze the possibility oftradeoffs between efficiency and equity as well as thepossibility of distributional conflicts in the context ofrenegotiation of infrastructure contracts in developingcountries. To do so, they present a model in which contractsare awarded by auctioning the right to operate aninfrastructure service to a private monopoly, and considerthe possibility of renegotiation. To identify the potentialsources of tradeoffs, they track the possible outcomes ofdifferent renegotiation strategies for the monopoly runningthe concession and for the two groups of consumers-rich andpoor-who alternate in power according to a majority votingrule. Among the model's most important policy implications isthis: if having firm-driven renegotiations is a majorconcern, efficiency should not be the only consideration inselecting an operator. Indeed, consumers may want to awardthe concession to a less efficient firm if that would reducethe probability of renegotiation, since a lower probabilityof firm-driven renegotiations (due to demand shocks, forexample) is associated with higher welfare for all service users.