Loan Loss Provisioning and Economic Slowdowns : Too Much, Too Late?

Laeven, Luc ; Majnoni, Giovanni

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: ACCOUNTING PRACTICES;    AGENTS;    ARBITRAGE;    BALANCE SHEET;    BALANCE SHEET INFORMATION;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-2749
RP-ID  :  WPS2749

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Only recently has the debate on bankcapital regulation devoted specific attention to the rolethat bank loan loss provisions can play as part of a minimumcapital regulatory framework. Several national regulatorshave adopted or are planning to introduce a cyclicallyadjustable requirement for loan loss provisions, and theBasel Committee on Banking Supervision is considering how toprovide adequate treatment to provisioning practices withina broad bank capital regulatory framework. The authorscontribute to the ongoing debate by exploring the availableevidence about bank provisioning practices around the world.They find that in the vast majority of cases banks tend todelay provisioning for bad loans until it is too late-whencyclical downturns have already set in-possibly magnifyingthe impact of the economic cycle on the income and capitalof banks. Notwithstanding the considerable variation in thepatterns followed by banks around the world, Laeven andMajnoni find that the size and timing of provisions tend toimprove with the level of economic development.