Social Polarization, Social Institutions, and Country Creditworthiness

Keefer, Philip ; Knack, Stephen

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: ABSOLUTE VALUE;    AGGREGATE INCOME;    AGRICULTURE;    ALTERNATIVE POLICIES;    ASSET INEQUALITY;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-2920
RP-ID  :  WPS2920

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

The literature argues that the presenceof multiple veto players (government decisionmakers) withpolarized interests increases the credibility of sovereigncommitments, but reduces the ability of governments toadjust policies in the event of exogenous shocks thatjeopardize their ability to honor their commitments. In thecase of sovereign lending, if the first effect prevails,countries would be regarded as more creditworthy; if thesecond, less. The authors address two issues. First, usingmeasures of country creditworthiness, they ask whether thenet effect of multiple veto players is positive or negative.Second, though, the authors go beyond the existingliterature to argue that the net effect of multiple vetoplayers depends on the nature of social polarization in acountry. In particular, they argue that politicalcompetition is fundamentally different in countriesexhibiting ethnic polarization than in countries polarizedaccording to income or wealth. The evidence supports theprediction that multiple veto players matter more whencountries are more ethnically polarized, but less whenincome inequality is greater.