The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution : Concepts and Country Studies

Beck, Thorsten

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: ACCOUNTABILITY;    ADVERSE SELECTION;    AGENTS;    APPLICATIONS;    AUDITING;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-3043
RP-ID  :  WPS3043

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Deposit insurance schemes and bankfailure resolution systems are asked to fulfill conflictingpublic policy objectives: on the one hand, they are supposedto protect small depositors and prevent contagion risks frombank runs; on the other hand, they are supposed to minimizeaggressive risk taking by banks. Beck discusses theincentive-compatible design and interaction of bothcomponents of the financial safety net and describes andcompares three countries with different safety netarrangements-Brazil, Germany, and Russia.