U.S. Contingent Protection against Honey Imports : Development Aspects and the Doha Round

Nogues, Julio J.

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: HONEY;    ANTIDUMPING DUTIES;    COUNTERVAILING DUTIES;    TRADE AGREEMENTS;    PROTECTIONISM;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-3088
RP-ID  :  WPS3088

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

On December 10, 2001 the U.S. Departmentof Commerce (DOC) imposed steep antidumping duties againsthoney imports from Argentina and China ranging from 32.6percent to 183.8 percent, and a countervailing duty againstArgentina of 5.9 percent. A previous antidumpinginvestigation in 1995 ended with a suspension"agreement" that curtailed U.S. imports from Chinaby around 30 percent. Millions of beekeepers around theworld, most of them poor, make a living from honeyproduction, and a free and competitive world market wouldhelp raise their standards of living. Nevertheless, thesequential pattern of increasing and widening protectionismfollowed by the United States, the world's topimporter, to include successful exporters under the effectsof its contingent protection measures sends a clear messagethat other countries should think twice before investing inexpanding honey exports to the United States. In addition tolooking into the trade effects of these contingentprotection measures, the author concludes that under theregulatory arrangements of the DOC, Argentina'sbeekeepers never had a chance of defending themselves. Forexample, responding to the DOC's lengthy andsophisticated questionnaires that sought to determine costof production went beyond the capacities of poor beekeepers.In the absence of information, the DOC resorted to evidencepresented by the petitioners which was riddled with errors.The available evidence suggests that had beekeepers beencapable of responding to the questionnaires, the margin ofdumping would had been lower, if at all existent. This andother evidence discussed by the author suggest the urgentneed to introduce reforms into the World Trade Organizationantidumping and subsidy agreements. At the minimum what isrequired is a consensus that all respondents be given thesame opportunity by the international trade rules. Theauthor argues that at present this is not the case andoffers suggestions for reforms.