Governance of Public Pension Funds : Lessons from Corporate Governance and International Evidence

Hess, David ; Impavido, Gregorio

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS;    ADVERSE SELECTION;    AGENCY PROBLEMS;    ASSET DIVERSIFICATION;    ASSETS;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-3110
RP-ID  :  WPS3110

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

An understanding of corporate governancetheory can promote the adoption of appropriate governancetools to limit agency problems in public pension fundmanagement. The absence of a market for corporate controlhinders the translation of lessons from the private sectorcorporate world to public pension governance. Theestablishment of a fit, and proper governing body for publicpension funds, thus may be even more important than themaintenance of a comparable body for private sectorcorporations. In particular, behavioral controls should becarefully designed.