Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation : Bargaining Power of Chinese Factories

Wang, Hua ; Mamingi, Nlandu ; Laplante, Benoî ; t ; Dasgupta, Susmita

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION;    ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS;    ENFORCEMENT POWERS;    FACTORIES;    LOCAL GOVERNMENT;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-2756
RP-ID  :  WPS2756

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Only a small number of studies haveempirically examined the determinants of the monitoring andenforcement performed by environmental regulators, and mostof these have focused on industrial countries. In contrast,the authors empirically examine the determinants ofenforcement in China. More precisely, they analyze thedeterminants of firms' relative bargaining power withlocal environmental authorities with respect to theenforcement of pollution charges. The authors show thatprivate sector firms appear to have less bargaining powerthan state-owned enterprises. Contrary to earlier findings,they also show that firms facing adverse financialsituations have more bargaining power than other firms andare more likely to pay smaller pollution charges than theyshould be paying. Finally, the authors show that the greaterthe social impact of a firm's emissions (as measured bycomplaints), the less bargaining power it has with localenvironmental authorities.