How Does Corporate Governance Affect Bank Capitalization Strategies?

Anginer, Deniz ; Demirguc-Kunt, Asli ; Huizinga, Harry ; Ma, Kebin

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: ACCOUNTING;    AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS;    AGENCY COSTS;    AGENCY PROBLEMS;    ANTI-TAKEOVER PROVISION;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-6636
RP-ID  :  WPS6636

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

This paper examines how corporategovernance and executive compensation affected bankcapitalization strategies for an international sample ofbanks in 2003-2011. "Good" corporate governance,which favors shareholder interests, is found to give rise tolower bank capitalization. Boards of intermediate size,separation of the chief executive officer and chairmanroles, and an absence of anti-takeover provisions, inparticular, lead to low bank capitalization. However,executive options and stock wealth invested in the bank areassociated with better capitalization except just before thecrisis in 2006. In that year, stock options wealth wasassociated with lower capitalization, which suggests thatpotential gains from taking on more bank risk outweighed theprospect of additional loss. Banks' tendencies tocontinue payouts to shareholders after experiencing negativeincome shocks are shown to reflect executive risk-taking incentives.