Banking Risks around the World : The Implicit Safety Net Subsidy Approach

Laeven, Luc

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: ACCOUNTING;    BANK ASSETS;    BANK FAILURE;    BANK MONITORING;    BANK OF KOREA;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-2473
RP-ID  :  WPS2473

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

The author calculates gross safety netsubsidies for a large sample of banks in 12 countries, toassess the relationship between the risk-taking behavior ofbanks, and certain ban characteristics. He finds that grosssafety net subsidies are higher for banks that haveconcentrated ownership, that are affiliated with a businessgroup, that are small, or that have high credit growth, andfor banks in countries with low GDP per capita, highinflation, or poor quality, and enforcement of the legalsystem. These findings suggest that the moral hazardbehavior of a bank depends on its institutional environment,and its corporate governance structure. The author alsopresents a matrix that shows estimates of safety netsubsidies for a range of given combinations of equityvolatilities, and equity-to-deposit ratios. These figurescould be used as input to an early warning system, for bothindividual, and systemic banking problems.