Electricity Auctions : An Overviewof Efficient Practices

Maurer, Luiz T. A. ; Barroso, Luiz A.

World Bank

关键词: AGGREGATE DEMAND;    ARBITRAGE;    AUCTION;    AUCTION DESIGN;    AUCTION DESIGNS;   

DOI  :  10.1596/978-0-8213-8822-8
RP-ID  :  63875

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

This report assesses the potential ofelectricity contract auctions as a procurement option forthe World Bank's client countries. It focuses on therole of auctions of electricity contracts designed to expandand retain existing generation capacity. It is not meant tobe a 'how-to' manual. Rather, it highlights somemajor issues and options that need to be taken into accountwhen a country considers moving towards competitiveelectricity procurement through the introduction ofelectricity auctions. Auctions have played an important rolein the effort to match supply and demand. Ever since the1990s, the use of long-term contract auctions to procure newgeneration capacity, notably from private sector suppliers,has garnered increased affection from investors,governments, and multilateral agencies in general, as ameans to achieve a competitive and transparent procurementprocess while providing certainty of supply for the mediumto long term. However, the liberalization of electricitymarkets and the move from single-buyer procurement modelsincreased the nature of the challenge facing system plannersin their efforts to ensure an adequate and secure supply ofelectricity in the future at the best price. While auctionsas general propositions are a means to match supply withdemand in a cost-effective manner, they can also be and havebeen used to meet a variety of goals.