Customs, Brokers, and Informal Sectors : A Cameroon Case Study

Cantens, Thomas ; Kaminski, Jonathan ; Raballand, Gaë ; l ; Tchapa, Tchouawou

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: ACCOUNTING;    AMOUNT OF DUTIES;    AREA OF CUSTOMS;    BANK ACCOUNT;    BARRIER TO ENTRY;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-6788
RP-ID  :  WPS6788

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Based on extensive interviews withinformal importers and brokers in Cameroon, this paperexplains why customs reform aimed at reducing fraud andcorruption may be difficult to achieve. Informal traders andbrokers (without licenses) follow various business modelsand practices, which are product-specific. Overall, whatmatters first are customs brokers' practices.Information asymmetries mark transactions between brokersand importers and are accompanied by misperceptions of thecosts and risks of informal brokers working among informalimporters. In a low-governance environment with widespreadinformal practices, blanket policies should be avoided inorder to discourage activities of unprofessional andsystematic bribe-taker brokers. It is also essential thatcustoms officials disrupt information asymmetries and betterdisseminate information to informal importers on customsprocesses and official costs. Finally, customs should morestrongly sanction some informal brokers in order to reducecollusion with some customs officers.