Contracting for the Second Best in Dysfunctional Electricity Markets

Nikandrova, Arina ; Steinbuks, Jevgenijs

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: ADVERSE SELECTION;    AGGREGATE SUPPLY;    APPROACH;    ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION;    AVAILABILITY;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-6955
RP-ID  :  WPS6955

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Power pools constitute a set ofsometimes complex institutional arrangements forefficiency-enhancing coordination among power systems. Wheresuch institutional arrangements do not exist, there stillcan be scope for voluntary electricity-sharing agreementsamong power systems. This paper uses a particular type ofefficient risk-sharing model with limited commitment todemonstrate that second-best coordination improvements canbe achieved with low to moderate risks of participantsleaving the agreement. In the absence of an impartial marketoperator who can observe fluctuations in connected powersystems, establishing quasi-markets for trading excesselectricity through the kind of mechanism described herehelps achieve sustainable cooperation in mutually beneficialelectricity sharing.