Political Economy of Infrastructure Spending in India

Khemani, Stuti

关键词: ACCOUNTABILITY;    ACCOUNTING;    ANTI-CORRUPTION;    BENEFICIARY;    BUDGET CONSTRAINT;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-5423
RP-ID  :  WPS5423

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

This paper examines a puzzle in thepolitical economy of infrastructure in India -- theco-existence of relatively low shares of capital spending inpublic budgets alongside evidence of large demand forvillage infrastructure from poor voters. It argues that thispattern is due to infrastructure projects being used at themargin for political rent-seeking, while spending onemployment and welfare transfers are the preferred vehiclesto win votes for re-election. New suggestive evidence on thevariation of public spending composition across states, andwithin states over time is offered that is consistent withthis argument. This evidence underscores a growing argumentin the development literature that the level and compositionof public spending per se may not be sufficient metrics toassess the quality of public goods policies -- greaterinfrastructure spending in some contexts may go to politicalrents rather than to the actual delivery of broad publicgoods for growth and poverty reduction.