Grameen Bank Lending : Does Group Liability Matter?

Khandker, Shahidur R.

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: ACCESS TO CREDIT;    ADVERSE SELECTION;    AGRICULTURE;    AMOUNT DUE;    AMOUNT OF LOAN;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-6204
RP-ID  :  WPS6204

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Competing theories increasingly supportthe positive role of social capital in small loan defaultcosts of group lending; at the same time, potential groupcollusion may increase loan delinquencies. Findings from theavailable literature are mixed on the role of the variousattributes of group lending. But past studies suffer fromestimation bias due to the unobserved sorting behavior ofgroup members and their other attributes. This paperattempts to resolve that estimation bias by utilizinglongitudinal data from 297 Grameen Bank groups since theirinceptions. A dynamic lagged dependent model with correctionfor time-varying heterogeneity of group and individualbehavior is applied to estimate the effect of groupliability in the Grameen Bank. The results suggest thatgroup liability matters in both loan disbursement andrepayment, with women less of a credit risk than men andwomen's groups more homogeneous than men's.Finally, the benefits of social capital outweigh the costsof group collusion, especially for women's groups,thereby reducing overall default rates. The risk-poolingbehavior of diverse men's groups increases men'srepayment behavior. Overall, group lending as practiced byGrameen Bank appears to increase repayment rates.