Containing Systemic Risk : Paradigm-Based Perspectives on Regulatory Reform

de la Torre, Augusto ; Ize, Alain

关键词: ACCOUNTING;    ADVERSE SELECTION;    AGENCY PROBLEMS;    ARBITRAGE;    ASSET MANAGERS;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-5523
RP-ID  :  WPS5523

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Financial crises can happen for avariety of reasons: (a) nobody really understands what isgoing on (the collective cognition paradigm); (b) someunderstand better than others and take advantage of theirknowledge (the asymmetric information paradigm); (c)everybody understands, but crises are a natural part of thefinancial landscape (the costly enforcement paradigm); or(d) everybody understands, yet no one acts because privateand social interests do not coincide (the collective actionparadigm). The four paradigms have different and oftenconflicting prudential policy implications. This paperproposes and discusses three sets of reforms that would givedue weight to the insights from the collective action andcollective cognition paradigms by redrawing the regulatoryperimeter to internalize systemic risk without promotingdynamic regulatory arbitrage; introducing a truly systemicliquidity regulation that moves away from a purelyidiosyncratic focus on maturity mismatches; and building upthe supervisory function while avoiding the pitfalls ofexpanded official oversight.