Buying Votes vs. Supplying Public Services : Political Incentives to Under-invest in Pro-poor Policies

Khemani, Stuti

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES;    ACCOUNTABILITY;    ACCOUNTING;    ANTENATAL CARE;    ASSETS;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-6339
RP-ID  :  WPS6339

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

This paper uses unique survey data toprovide, for the first time in the literature, directevidence that vote buying in poor economies is associatedwith lower provision of public services thatdisproportionately benefit the poor. Various features of thedata and the institutional context allow the interpretationof this correlation as the equilibrium policy consequence ofclientelist politics, ruling out alternate explanations(such as, for example, poverty driving both vote buying andhealth outcomes). The data come from the Philippines, acountry context that allows for measuring vote buying duringelections and services delivered by the administrative unitcontrolled by winners of those elections. The data reveal asignificant, robust negative correlation between vote buyingand the delivery of primary health services. In places wherehouseholds report more vote buying, government records showthat municipalities invest less in basic health services formothers and children; and, quite strikingly, as a summarymeasure of weak service delivery performance, a higherpercentage of children are severely under-weight.