Corporate Governance and Bank Performance : A Joint Analysis of the Static, Selection, and Dynamic Effects of Domestic, Foreign, and State Ownership

Berger, Allen N. ; Clarke, George R. G. ; Cull, Robert ; Klapper, Leora ; Udell, Gregory F.

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: AFFILIATES;    BALANCE SHEETS;    BANK ASSETS;    BANK DEPOSITS;    BANK LENDING;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-3632
RP-ID  :  WPS3632

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

The authors jointly analyze the static, selection, and dynamic effects of domestic, foreign, and state ownership on bank performance. They argue that it is important to include indicators of all the relevant governance effects in the same model. "Nonrobustness" checks (which purposely exclude some indicators) support this argument. Using data from Argentina in the 1990s, their strongest and most robust results concern state ownership. State-owned banks have poor long-term performance (static effect), those undergoing privatization had particularly poor performance beforehand (selection effect), and these banks dramatically improved following privatization (dynamic effect. However, much of the measured improvement is likely due to placing nonperforming loans into residual entities, leaving "good" privatized banks.