Microfinance Games

Giné ; , Xavier ; Jakiela, Pamela ; Karlan, Dean ; Morduch, Jonathan

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: ADVERSE SELECTION;    AGENTS;    BANKS;    COMMERCIAL BANKS;    CREDIT MARKETS;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-3959
RP-ID  :  WPS3959

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Microfinance has been heralded as an effective way to address imperfections in credit markets. But from a theoretical perspective, the success of microfinance contracts has puzzling elements. In particular, the group-based mechanisms often employed are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion, although they can also reduce moral hazard and improve selection. The authors created an experimental economics laboratory in a large urban market in Lima, Peru and over seven months conducted 11 different games that allow them to unpack microfinance mechanisms in a systematic way. They find that risk-taking broadly conforms to predicted patterns, but that behavior is safer than optimal. The results help to explain why pioneering microfinance institutions have been moving away from group-based contracts.