Equitable Provision of Long-Term Public Goods : The Role of Negotiation Mandates

Lecocq, Franck ; Hourcade, Jean-Charles

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: ABATEMENT;    ABATEMENT COST FUNCTIONS;    ABATEMENT COSTS;    ATMOSPHERE;    BENCHMARK;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-3180
RP-ID  :  WPS3180

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

In a one-period model, whether or notindividual weights in the welfare function are based oninitial endowments dictate who provides public goods. Butwith long-term public goods, banning wealth redistributionstill allows for several equilibriums depending onParties' willingness to acknowledge changes innegotiating powers over time, and on whether or not theycare only for their own descendants. Adaptative anduniversal mandates lead to far more robust equilibrium. Inall cases, a simple rule of thumb for allocatingexpenditures at first period emerges, independent of boththe optimal level of public goods and the second-perioddistribution of expenditures.