Promises, Promises : Vote-Buying and the Electoral Mobilization Strategies of Non-Credible Politicians

Hanusch, Marek ; Keefer, Philip

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: VOTE BUYING;    CLIENT;    ELECTION ADMISNITRATION;    CREDIBLE COMMITTMENT;    POLICITAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-6653
RP-ID  :  WPS6653

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Vote-buying is pervasive, but noteverywhere. What explains significant variations acrosscountries in the greater use of pre-electoral transfers tomobilize voters relative to the use of pre-electoralpromises of post-electoral transfers? This paper explicitlymodels the trade-offs that politicians incur when theydecide between mobilizing support with vote-buying orpromises of post-electoral benefits. Politicians rely moreon vote-buying when they are less credible, targetvote-buying to those who do not believe their politicalpromises, and only buy votes from those who would havereceived post-electoral transfers in a world of fullpolitical credibility. The enforcement of a prohibition onvote-buying reduces the welfare of those targeted withvote-buying, but improves the welfare of all other groups in society.