Elections, Special Interests, andthe Fiscal Costs of Financial Crisis

Keefer, Philip

World Bank, Washington, D.C.

关键词: ACCOUNTABILITY;    AGRICULTURE;    AMBITION;    BAILOUT COSTS;    BANK ASSETS;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-3439
RP-ID  :  WPS3439

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

The author proposes a new approach toexplain why the costs of crisis are greater in somecountries than in others. He begins with the premise thatmany crises result from the willingness of politicians tocater to special interests, at the expense of broad socialinterests. A parsimonious model predicts that the lesscostly it is for average citizens to expel politicians, themore veto players there are; the less important areexogenous shocks, and the more difficult it is forpoliticians and special interests to forge credibleagreements, the lower the costs of crisis are. Though thesepredictions differ from those in the literature, empiricalevidence presented shows that they explain the fiscal costsof financial crisis, even after controlling for thefinancial sector policies believed to contribute most to theefficient prevention, and resolution of financial crisis.