Conditional Cash Transfers andthe Equity-Efficiency Debate

Das, Jishnu ; Do, Quy-Toan ; Ö ; zler, Berk

World Bank, Washington, D.C.

关键词: CASH TRANSFERS;    EQUITY;    HUMAN CAPITAL;    HEALTH;    EDUCATION;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-3280
RP-ID  :  WPS3280

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

During the past decade, the use ofconditional cash transfers to increase investment in humancapital has generated considerable excitement in bothresearch and policy forums. Such schemes are beingincreasingly adopted in a number of contexts and countriesto improve outcomes in health, education, and child labor asthey aim to balance the goals of current and future povertyreduction. In this paper, the authors define any schemerequiring a specified course of action in order to receive abenefit as a conditional cash transfer. This definitionincludes cash transfers based on human capital investments,but is sufficiently broad to encompass other schemes such aswork-fare programs or consumption transfers.The authorsexamine the rationales behind, the problems with, and thetradeoffs inherent to conditional cash transfer programs.They discuss two main concerns: low participation andfungibility. Low participation refers to the problem ofprogram uptake. If individuals do not participate in theprogram, whether it was designed to increase human capitalinvestment or to target resources, the program will not besuccessful. The problem of fungibility, however, depends onthe rationale for the particular conditional cash transferprogram. When used to increase efficiency, even when programuptake is high, program effects may be less than envisioneddue to behavioral responses of households that lead tochanges in the consumption of close substitutes. Whileresearchers have typically addressed these issuesseparately, the authors emphasize the need for policymakersto incorporate a number of different factors in acomprehensive framework to design optimal conditional cashtransfer schemes.