The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance

Laeven, Luc

World Bank, Washington, D.C.

关键词: ACCOUNTABILITY;    BANK CAPITAL;    BANK DEPOSITS;    BANK REGULATION;    BANK RISK;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-3247
RP-ID  :  WPS3247

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

The author uses a political economyframework to analyze cross-country differences in depositinsurance coverage. He finds supporting evidence of thesignificance of private interest theories in explainingcoverage of deposit insurance. Deposit insurance coverage issignificantly higher in countries where poorly capitalizedbanks dominate the market and in countries where depositorsare poorly educated. The author does not find that coverageis significantly related to political-institutionalvariables, such as the degree of democracy or restraints onthe executive, or to proxies for the general level ofinstitutional development, such as per capita income orproperty rights. These results provide evidence in supportof the private interest view, according to which risky bankslobby for extensive coverage.