Developing Countries and Enforcement of Trade Agreements : Why Dispute Settlement is Not Enough

Bown, Chad P. ; Bernard M., Hoekman

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: ACCESSION;    ADVERSE EFFECT;    AGREEMENT ON TRADE;    AGRICULTURAL TARIFFS;    ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-4450
RP-ID  :  WPS4450

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Poor countries are rarely challenged informal World Trade Organization trade disputes for failingto live up to commitments, reducing the benefits of theirparticipation in international trade agreements. This paperexamines the political-economic causes of the failure tochallenge poor countries, and discusses the static anddynamic costs and externality implications of this failure.Given the weak incentives to enforce World TradeOrganization rules and disciplines against small and poormembers, bolstering the transparency function of the WorldTrade Organization is important for making trade agreementsmore relevant to trade constituencies in developingcountries. Although the paper focuses on the World TradeOrganization system, the arguments also apply to reciprocalNorth-South trade agreements.