Upping the Ante : The Equilibrium Effects of Unconditional Grants to Private Schools

Andrabi, Tahir ; Das, Jishnu ; Khwaja, Asim I. ; Ozyurt, Selcuk ; Singh, Niharika

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: PRIVATE EDUCATION;    FINANCIAL INNOVATION;    STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT;    EDUCATION MARKETS;    RETURN TO CAPITAL;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-8563
RP-ID  :  WPS8563

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

This paper tests for financialconstraints as a market failure in education in a low-incomecountry. In an experimental setup, unconditional cash grantsare allocated to one private school or all private schoolsin a village. Enrollment increases in both treatments,accompanied by infrastructure investments. However, testscores and fees only increase in the setting of all privateschools along with higher teacher wages. This differentialimpact follows from a canonical oligopoly model withcapacity constraints and endogenous quality: greaterfinancial saturation crowds-in quality investments. Thefindings of higher social surplus in the setting of allprivate schools, but greater private returns in the settingof one private school underscore the importance ofleveraging market structure in designing educational subsidies.